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                                  MINDFUL VIRTUE, MINDFUL REVERENCE 
                          by Ursula Goodenough and Paul Woodruff 
Draft of article published in Zygon 36: 585-595  (2001)     
 
Abstract.     How does one talk about moral thought and moral action as a 
religious naturalist?  We explore this question by considering two human 
capacities: the capacity for mindfulness, and the capacity for virtue.  We suggest 
that mindfulness is deeply enhanced by an understanding of the scientific 
worldview, and that the four cardinal virtues – courage, fairmindedness, 
humaneness, and reverence – are rendered coherent by mindful reflection.  We 
focus on the concept of mindful reverence, and propose that the mindful 
reverence elicited by the evolutionary narrative is at the heart of religious 
naturalism.  Religious education, we suggest, entails the cultivation of mindful 
virtue, in ourselves and in our children. 
 
Keywords.    mindfulness, morality, religious naturalism, reverence, virtue ethics 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This essay represents an intellectual and spiritual collaboration.  Goodenough is 
a cell biologist whose recent book, The Sacred Depths of Nature (1998), 
explores the religious potential of our scientific understandings of nature and 
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advocates an orientation called religious naturalism.  Woodruff is a moral 
philosopher whose recent book, Reverence (2001), explores the concept of 
reverence in the context of virtue ethics.  Since reverence is often invoked in The 
Sacred Depths of Nature, it became apparent that we were pursuing a similar 
quest, and further conversation has led to the crafting of this shared perspective.    
 
The core question we will consider is:  How does one talk about moral 
thought and moral action as a religious naturalist?   
 
Scientists are expected to approach this question in a scientific fashion, 
and many have done so.  From such research have emerged such useful 
concepts as kin altruism and reciprocal altruism, concepts that use genetic and 
game-theory algorithms to describe how we negotiate the allocation of favors and 
retribution (Ridley, 1998).  But most people, including most of the game-theory 
scientists themselves, understand that these economic algorithms are not what 
we seek as religious persons.  Rather, we seek ideals and values.  We want to 
understand how best to be good.  We want to know what to say to our children. 
 
In this essay we first consider the human capacity known as mindfulness, 
and suggest that the development of mindfulness is a precondition for morality.  
We next consider the human capacity known as virtue, and suggest that a 
morality based on the development of mindful virtue is an approach that seems 
particularly compatible with religious naturalism.  We conclude with a focus on 
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the virtue reverence, and propose that the pursuit of mindful reverence is 
fundamental to the moral life of the religious naturalist.   
 
MINDFULNESS IN THE RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITIONS 
 
 To get into thinking about mindfulness, we can start with Aristotle.  
Aristotle begins his treatise on Metaphysics with a strong assertion:  “All human 
beings by nature reach out for knowledge” (Metaphysics 1.1, 980a21).  Most of 
us, if asked to give a description of human nature, would probably include 
something along these lines in our response, and indeed, it is embedded in the 
biological name we have given to ourselves, where the sapiens in Homo sapiens 
means “having wisdom.”  Wisdom and knowledge are entailed by mindfulness, 
but we suggest that mindfulness demands more of us.  Mindfulness is knowledge 
or wisdom that pulls the whole mind-and-heart of the knower towards a 
connection with the way things are in all their exciting particularity.  You cannot 
be mindful and know things in a purely academic way; as you become mindful of 
something, your feelings and your behavior towards it will not be untouched. 
 
Mindfulness is both a state of mind and a practice.  The practice, 
popularized in the west by Vietnamese Zen master Thich Nhat Hanh, is 
summarized by his famous epigram “Washing the Dishes to Wash the Dishes” 
(Nhat Hahn, 1975, p.3).  That is, one trains oneself to keep one’s consciousness 
alive to the present reality, to focus attention on the here-and-now, on the miracle 
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of the soap and the water and the dishes and the process, rather than rushing 
through the chore mindlessly to get to whatever is next.  In his sutra on 
Mindfulness (Satipatthana Sutta, reprinted in Nhat Hahn, 1975, p. 111), the 
Buddha refers to mindfulness as one of the enlightenment factors, along with 
such others as joy, tranquility, concentration, and equanimity.  The mindful 
person, Buddhism tells us, assumes the attitude of pure observation, freed from 
all false views, and apprehends a reality that is not only objective but also 
becomes subjective.  The mindful person really really sees. 
 
 Three features of mindfulness are encountered not only in Buddhist 
thought but also in the writings of the ancient Greeks and the Chinese 
Confucians.   
 
First, mindfulness is described as a path, a work in progress, rather than 
as an endpoint or achievement.  This is because the mindful person is prepared 
to perceive each particular situation in its uniqueness and respond to it 
appropriately, while knowledge (as the ancient Greeks understood it) aims at 
grasping universal principles and applying them uniformly in all cases.  Aristotle's 
concept of practical wisdom (phronesis) is an ethical sort of mindfulness.  It is a 
kind of wisdom because it is a capacity to get a great many things right, and it is 
practical because it is the link between our minds and our moral character.  He 
tells us that mindfulness, so understood, entails a long process of living and 
choosing, a process that develops a person’s resourcefulness and 
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responsiveness (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 305).  And Confucius, in the course of 
describing the various life stages leading to sagehood, offers a wonderful 
epigram, variously phrased as  "At sixty, my ear was attuned," or, "At sixty, my 
ears became subtly perceptive" (Analects 2.4,Translations by Simon Leys 1997, 
Chichung Huang 1997). 
 
 Second, mindfulness is described as “freed from all false views” (Nhat 
Hanh, 1975, p.56).  Pure observation, the perception of reality, cannot occur 
through the lens of one’s own needs, biases, and prejudice.  Rigidity, dogmatism, 
and fundamentalism are fatal to mindfulness from one direction, while inattention, 
fickleness, and carelessness can destroy it from another.  Aristotle tells us that 
mindfulness is constantly evolving, ready for surprise (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 305).   
 
             And third, mindfulness entails an immersion, a personal appropriation of 
reality.  Aristotle describes it as a complex response of the entire personality; 
Thich Nhat Hahn writes that when we practice mindfulness of objects outside 
ourselves, the knowledge of these objects becomes mind (Nhat Hahn, 1975, p. 
46); and the Confucians tell us that we must attain a deep personal 
understanding of our own being and the being of others if we are to respond 
faithfully to their reality.  What is sought, they explain, is “self-transformation 
through a personal grasp” (Kalton, 1988).   
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The fascinating concordance between Greek, Indian, and Chinese 
perceptions of mindfulness, as sketched in the above passages, is especially 
remarkable given that they were originally articulated thousands of years ago and 
independently of one another.  To us this indicates that we are considering a 
facet of human aspiration that is of fundamental importance.  The quest for 
mindfulness, we would say, is a core human hope, a core human ideal.  
 
MINDFULNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF RELIGIOUS NATURALISM 
 
In the broadest and deepest sense, the “naturalism” part of religious 
naturalism is all about mindfulness.  Scientists, trained in a particular kind of 
“pure observation,” have provisioned us with stunning understandings of the 
natural world, and these understandings then provision the religious naturalist 
with countless substrates for mindful apprehension.  So, for example, 
mindfulness of the body is no longer just about breathing and walking as in the 
original Buddhist practice; we are now able to contemplate as well the molecular 
and genetic underpinnings of the body and its evolution from simpler forms.  
When the Dalai Lama visited Washington University several years ago, he 
insisted on a visit to the neuroimaging laboratories where brains are being 
analyzed as they think and feel.  There emerged a photograph of the Dalai Lama 
in his robes talking with the neuroscientists in their lab coats.  An icon to 
mindfulness. 
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The religious naturalist is called to be mindful of the following 
understandings from biology:  
• Mindful of our place in the scheme of things 
 
• Mindful that life evolved, that humans are primates 
  
• Mindful of the dynamics of molecular life and its emergent 
properties 
 
• Mindful of the fragility of life and its ecosystems 
 
• Mindful that life and the planet are wildly improbable 
 
• Mindful that all of life is interconnected 
 
• Mindful of the uniqueness of each creature 
 
• Mindful of future generations 
 
  
And from psychology and anthropology: 
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• Mindful that our thoughts and feelings are neural 
 
• Mindful of the evolutionary continuity between our minds and other 
animals’ minds  
 
• Mindful of human diversity, including diversity of temperament 
 
• Mindful of human creativity and its wondrous manifestations  
 
• Mindful of the influence of ethnic and family roots and tribal 
connection 
 
• Mindful that children best flourish when loved and nurtured 
 
• Mindful of the human need for personal wholeness and social 
coherence 
  
 
 Similar lists can be drawn from the physical sciences and the earth 
sciences, from cultural history and imaginative literature, and so on.  All such lists 
are expected to be incomplete and open-ended.  They are offered here to remind 
us of what is at stake.   
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 If we have been successful in communicating what mindfulness is about, 
then it should be possible to recognize the difference between knowing about the 
listed items and being mindful of them.  Knowledge is of course essential:  there 
is much nuts-and-bolts information to absorb, for example, about how nerve cells 
communicate with one another in the body and in the brain.  But one can learn 
facts and remain un-mindful of these facts, as evinced by the tragedy of most of 
our educational systems.  There is much to learn, and then there is also much to 
consider. 
 
VIRTUE 
 
Virtue ethics is particularly well developed in Greek and Confucian thought 
and, notably through Aquinas’s encounters with Aristotle, in Christian thought as 
well (MacIntyre 1981, pp. 154-68, Hauerwas 1981, 111-28).  The idea is that a 
virtuous person will do the right thing, make the right choice, in most 
circumstances, without necessarily asking how moral rules apply to the case.  
Virtue has this result consistently only if certain conditions obtain:  (1) The 
virtuous person must be mindful of the relevant circumstances (the Samaritan 
must see the victim who needs help). (2) The virtuous person must be sustained 
by a virtuous community (the brave deep-sea fisherman needs to work with a 
brave crew). 
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Rules may be hard to follow, either because they don’t seem to fit a given 
case very well or because, in and of themselves, rules aren’t very exciting.  Rules 
don’t make us feel like following them.  Virtues, by contrast, belong to our 
emotional life; they are rather like habits of feeling, and the virtuous person feels 
like doing the right thing (whatever that turns out to be).  Therefore, the most 
enduring way to develop morality is to develop virtue.   
 
Obviously this approach depends critically on how virtue is understood.  
We won’t have anything to say in this essay about where we think the virtues 
might “come from” -- whether they have antecedents in primate mentality and/or 
whether they are manifestations of the divine.  While these are interesting 
questions, we are more interested here in exploring how the virtues support and 
explain our moral choices.  Wherever the capacity for virtue comes from, we 
believe that it is poised to play a fundamental role in our search for global ethical 
consensus.  
 
“Virtue” is an all-but-unused word in our times.  It sounds old-fashioned, 
even quaint, and has come to connote a judgmental self-righteousness, a puffed-
up rigidity, that up-to-date intellectuals have learned to eschew.   Displacing 
virtue concepts from our vocabulary is the notion that what’s most important is to 
be tolerant and accepting and nice—a notion that leads to the sense that one can 
say nothing of consequence about ethics.  From our perspective, this path, 
however well meaning, is arrogant, lazy, and an evasion of responsibility.  It’s 
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time, we would say, that we return to the search for virtue.  There need be 
nothing old-fashioned or conservative about this.  True, some advocates of 
virtues ethics are conservative in politics, but others are liberal, and many are 
openly critical of rigid moral codes.  
  
 So how is virtue defined?  It’s hard to pin down a particular virtue because 
a virtue is wonderfully sensitive to context.   But Aristotle gives us a useful 
framework for thinking about virtues (Nicomachean Ethics  Book 2).  A virtue, he 
suggests, is an element in a person’s character that tempers emotions at the 
source.  Virtue is the capacity to experience emotions well—that is, at the right 
time and at the right level. For example, the more you have of the virtue that 
tempers fear and confidence, then the better your levels of fear or confidence will 
be each time they are called for.  You will not be too timid to take necessary 
risks, nor so bold as to destroy yourself.  The virtue that accomplishes this 
balance, according to Aristotle, is courage  (Nicomachean Ethics 3.2). 
 
    Many lists of the virtues have been compiled.  We offer a list of four that 
appear to be cardinal virtues, both because of their importance to us and 
because we think it will prove to be the case that they are found in a wide variety 
of cultures.  They are: 
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• Humaneness  (the capacity to see, with appropriate feeling, how similar other 
people’s situations are to our own; the capacity for love, in an important sense 
of love)  
• Courage (the capacity to balance confidence and fear; the source of 
creativity) 
• Fair-mindedness (the capacity to recognize what is just and to be angry at 
what is unjust); and  
• Reverence (the capacity for awe and respect)  
 
The quest to attain these virtues, like the quest to achieve mindfulness, is a 
humbling quest.  Therefore, to be self-righteous about one’s virtue is to not 
understand the concept.  Moreover, the virtues cannot exist as stand-alone items 
– they are all of a piece.  Cowardice will undermine fair-mindedness, and 
injustice is incompatible with humaneness.  Therefore, to be virtuous is to 
develop capacities that are interwoven and interdependent.  This extends as well 
to our communities:  We depend on each other to sustain an atmosphere in 
which virtue can flourish. 
 
Virtues are ideals, visions of the good.  They are ways that we can’t think 
better than.  A particularly attractive feature of the virtues is that, as with 
mindfulness, there is a universality about them that suggests their deep 
rootedness in who we are as human beings.  In cultures and religions and 
archetypal images throughout the world and throughout history, the same virtues 
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show up again and again, addressing the same sets of feelings and suggesting 
the same kinds of strategies for resolution.  This is not surprising, of course, 
since our most basic emotions, and hence our feelings, are common to us all, 
and the virtues represent the theaters wherein these emotional endowments are 
forged into moral choices.  The ubiquity of the virtues suggests their core 
importance in defining our aspirations, and hence our hopes.  
 
MINDFUL VIRTUE 
 
We can now circle back to our initial account of virtue in which we wrote 
about doing the right thing and making the right choice and having the right 
feelings.  How are all these “rights” to be ascertained? 
 
It is here that we can bring in mindfulness, and talk not about virtue but 
about mindful virtue.   The pursuit of virtue, we would say, will bear fruit only in 
the context of mindfulness.  Mindfulness is a precondition for virtue, or, rather, 
the development of mindfulness and the development of virtue must go together 
as an essential collaboration.   
 
Let’s look at an example.  In the absence of mindfulness, one might be led 
to believe in the superiority of one’s own ethnic group and to believe that it is just 
to persecute those in other ethnic groups.  But mindful consideration of human 
evolution and human interrelatedness and human commonality is thoroughly 
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incompatible with the concept of ethnic superiority.  To hold on to that conclusion, 
therefore, one would have to allow one’s needs and biases to cloud and then 
subvert one’s perception of reality, and such violations of mindfulness would 
encourage the espousal of fundamentalist dogma. 
 
MINDFUL REVERENCE  
  
As our final topic, we will consider the virtue known as reverence, which 
we would now want to call mindful reverence.  Reverence turns out to be a 
particularly complex virtue to define, but it’s worth the effort. 
 
In his book on the subject, Woodruff defines reverence (Woodruff 2001, p. 
117) as the capacity to carry the sense that there is Something larger than a 
human being, and hence Something larger than one’s self, a Something that 
possesses one or more of the following properties:   
• It cannot be changed or controlled by humans;  
• It is not fully understood by experts; 
• It is not created by humans; and  
• It can be described as transcendent, where transcendence is itself a 
complicated concept that we will come back to shortly  
 
Since virtues are about the balance of feelings, we can ask what sets of 
feelings are negotiated during the development of reverence?  We would say that 
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reverence allows us to balance our personal ambitions with the sense that we 
are in a context that is vastly larger and more important than our selves.  This 
generates awe and respect for that context, meaning that mindful reverence can 
also be defined as the capacity to feel awe and respect when these are the right 
feelings to have.  Reverent persons experience awe in the presence of 
something transcendent but not in the presence of something base.  They accord 
respect to the dignity of other persons, but only when respect is the right attitude:  
the most reverent response to a tyrant, Woodruff suggests, is to mock him (2001, 
p. 5).   Fatal to mindful reverence are pomposity and self-absorption.  To speak 
of self-reverence is to not understand the term. 
 
Reverence is also about shame and outrage.  When we desecrate an 
object of reverence we are ashamed, and when we witness irreverence towards 
that object in others, we feel outrage and even contempt towards the irreverent 
persons.  It is important, from our perspective, not to cave in to modern attacks 
on shame and outrage.  They are crucial manifestations of reverence, measures 
of the depth of our commitment to what we revere.  “Life without shame would be 
a disaster” (Woodruff 2001, p. 73).  This is an exciting and invigorating aspect of 
mindful reverence, and of the mindful virtues in general, since the virtuous 
person also experiences outrage at unfairness, cruelty, and cowardice.  Virtue, 
from this point of view, is not some passive goody-two-shoes state of self-
anointed superiority.  It entails active engagement and strong character and a 
sense of honor.  As kids today would say, virtue is not for a wuss. 
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Reverence is often shared with other persons in the form of ceremony, 
such as the ceremonies that undergird reverent family life, reverent political 
systems, and reverent cultural and religious practice.  Reverence is about 
celebration as well, about offering praise, lighting a sacred candle, drumming and 
dancing way into the night.  We bow our heads in the presence of that which we 
revere, not so much in deference as in gratitude.   
 
Reverence is commonly associated with the supernatural, as in reverence 
towards a deity.  Similarly, the word transcendence is commonly associated with 
the supernatural, as in a transcendent deity.  But both words also work in the 
context of the natural.  Most religions offer ways to express reverence towards 
the Earth, and transcendence is something that we can experience not only in 
the vertical sense, as in something “up on high,” but also in the horizontal sense, 
as in the quiet thrill of belonging to a truly spectacular universe (Goodenough, 
2001). 
 
This puts us in a position to make a central claim.  For the religious 
naturalist, whether theistic or nontheistic, the natural world, the material world, 
represents a wondrous object of mindful reverence.  It meets Woodruff’s 
definitional criteria with flying colors:   
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• It is larger than a human being (Indeed, it is our source, if not our 
Source). 
• It cannot be changed or controlled by humans (We can manipulate 
nature, to be sure, but we cannot change its fundamental 
properties). 
• It is not fully understood by experts (We do not understand, for 
example, how nature becomes human nature). 
• It is not created by humans (It is our given, if not our Given).   
• It can be described as transcendent (the transcendence on offer 
here being both vertical and horizontal).  And finally,   
• It elicits awe and respect and hence humility.  When we desecrate 
the natural order of things, we feel shame; when we witness its 
desecration by others, we experience outrage and voice protest. 
 
 
Therefore, mindful reverence has everything to do with religious 
naturalism.  Indeed, we can take religious naturalism, translate “religious” as 
“reverent” and “naturalism” as “mindfulness,” and recognize that the orientation 
we are calling religious naturalism can be said to be embedded, at core, in 
reverent mindfulness. 
 
And now, to the heart of things.  When we say that we hold in mindful 
reverence certain ideals, we are saying that we care about them.  Care, in turn, 
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generates commitment:  To say that I care about my ideals is to say that I feel an 
obligation towards them, a responsibility towards them.  Obligation and 
responsibility are manifestations of mindful reverence in the same way that brave 
deeds are a manifestation of courage and acting justly is a manifestation of fair-
mindedness and acting with compassion is a manifestation of humaneness.  
Shame and outrage come in here as well.  When I fail to meet my obligations I 
feel shame at my shortcomings.  When I witness someone acting irresponsibly 
towards something I revere, I feel outrage and speak out in protest against that 
behavior.  The virtues are not just about how we think and feel.   They represent 
the wellsprings of our moral action. 
 
At this point we have started along the path of a virtue ethics for religious 
naturalism.  What we are suggesting is that our human nature includes capacities 
to understand, cultivate, and revere the goodness of being courageous and 
fairminded and humane and reverent and mindful.   This is not to say that this is 
all that we are.  We are also beings who laugh and imagine and make love and 
create and play.  But when we turn to thinking about the basis for our ethics, 
what we find is that rich ethical resources are embedded in our nature, 
coexisting, mano à mano, with other facets of our nature such as fear and greed.  
Developing our natural capacity for mindful virtue helps us not only to resist fear 
and greed, but to rise above them as we learn to heed the better angels of our 
nature.  
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VIRTUE ETHICS AND COMMUNITY 
  
Virtue ethics carries with it a vulnerability, a voluntary vulnerability.  By 
assuming agency for my own actions rather than just going along with the rules 
of the system, I open myself to shame at my failures and outrage at the failures 
of others.  The more openly I respond to the world with mindful virtue, the more 
deeply distressed I am by acts of injustice and cowardice and cruelty and self-
centeredness.  The more I care, the more I am vulnerable to feelings of violation.   
 
Relief from this vulnerability is best found, we believe, in communities of 
persons who join us in the pursuit of mindful reverence, who share our 
perspectives and values, and who offer love and support when we are 
devastated by discouragement.  We are called to find and sustain communities 
wherein we can suffer and celebrate with kindred spirits, sharing our reverence 
for all that we hold in awe, toward all that we find, in our common search, to be 
transcendent. 
 
CODA 
 
We close with a particularly beautiful example of mindful reverence.  The 
example comes from Geoffrey Miller’s new book, The Mating Mind:  How Sexual 
Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature (2000).  In a chapter called 
“Courtship in the Pleistocene,” he suggests that many of our “most human” traits, 
 20 
such as music and poetry and virtue, are the product of sexual selection.  
Whether or not one agrees with this thesis is beside the point here.  Of 
importance are the last two paragraphs of this chapter (p. 222), an eloquent 
instance of how mindfulness – in this case, an understanding of human evolution 
– can couple with reverence – in this case reverence for our human 
connectedness. 
 
It should go without saying, but I’ll say it anyway:  all of the significant 
evolution in our species occurred in populations with brown and black 
skins living in Africa.  At the beginning of hominid evolution five million 
years ago, our ape-like ancestors had dark skin just like chimpanzees and 
gorillas.  When modern Homo sapiens evolved a hundred thousand years 
ago, we still had dark skins.  When brain sizes tripled, they tripled in 
Africans.  When sexual choice shaped human nature, it shaped Africans.  
When language, music, and art evolved, they evolved in Africans.  Lighter 
skins evolved in some European and Asian populations long after the 
human mind evolved its present capacities. 
 
The skin color of our ancestors does not have much scientific importance.  
But it does have a political importance given the persistence of anti-black 
racism.  I think that a powerful antidote to such racism is the realization 
that the human mind is a product of black African females favoring 
intelligence, kindness, creativity, and articulate language in black African 
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males, and vice versa.  Afrocentrism is an appropriate attitude to take 
when we are thinking about human evolution. 
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